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I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of zoning in America, laws have
operated to balance the interests of government, developers, and
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homeowners to develop optimal living environments and maintain
property values through a fair process. Zoning laws reflect the
socially and culturally constructed “societal consensus” regarding
1
what land uses are “normal and expected, decent, and desirable.”
While developers, homeowners, and governments alike encouraged
the adoption of zoning ordinances in the early twentieth century,
the appropriate degree of local discretion in the zoning process
2
continues to be disputed to this day.
Conditional use permit (CUP) processes were adopted to
3
enable greater discretion in zoning. However, increasing local
discretion created controversial issues: How much discretion
should a local governing body have in zoning decisions? What is an
arbitrary decision? What is the relative authority of a zoning
ordinance versus a comprehensive plan? Understanding the
evolution of American zoning illuminates the continued efforts of
state legislatures and courts to limit the discretion of local
governing bodies in order to improve predictability and efficiency
in the zoning process for private property owners.
In RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that it was within a city’s discretion to deny a request for
a CUP to expand an assisted living facility because increased traffic
volume would “injure the neighborhood or otherwise harm the
4
public health, safety, and welfare.” The court found that evidence
of prospective traffic volume would exacerbate existing traffic
5
concerns, as expressed by neighborhood opposition testimony.
However, the neighborhood concerns were not substantiated by
6
additional evidence.
This case note begins by tracing the development of CUP
7
processes as a tool for flexibility in zoning law. Then, this note
1. SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA 3 (2014).
2. John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A
Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 821, 829–34 (2006) (discussing the shift of zoning regulations to local
municipalities).
3. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND
POLICIES 7 (1966).
4. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington (RDNT III), 861 N.W.2d 71, 77
(Minn. 2015).
5. Id. at 76–77.
6. See id. at 73–74, 76–77 (discussing only traffic volume and not issues
related to “livability,” such as on-street parking, speeding, disregarding laws, etc.).
7. See infra Part II.
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discusses the facts and the court’s rationale in the RDNT decision.
Next, it argues that by conflating traffic capacity and livability
issues, the court deviated from precedent that prohibits
neighborhood opposition testimony from being the sole basis to
9
deny a CUP. Finally, this note concludes that the unfettered use of
neighborhood opposition testimony creates barriers to the
development of critical services for vulnerable Minnesotans and
10
undermines a process intended to balance property interests.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

The Emergence of Zoning Laws: Agrarian Idealism, Urbanization,
and the Rise of Efficient Municipal Land Use Regulation

America’s revered agrarian past—which idealized low-density,
autonomous living—helped establish the single-family residential
district as a driving force in modern municipal law. Prior to the
American industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, only six
11
percent of Americans lived in cities. American agrarianism was
held in such high esteem that it “became a philosophy, a
quintessential aspiration that defined what was most virtuous in the
American character and what distinguished the new republic from
12
the European autocracies.”
As America urbanized, the detached single-family home
emerged as the ideal form of American housing, which maintained
a legacy of “individual autonomy, restless mobility, the turning of
13
nature into property, and private spatial conquests.” The
industrial revolution upset America’s agrarian ideal, forced rural

8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See HIRT, supra note 1, at 117 (citing JOHN M. LEVY, CONTEMPORARY URBAN
PLANNING 9 (10th ed. 2013)).
12. Id. at 113. Even more, there was a perception that land was a “limitless
natural resource that was physically and culturally vacant” and “could and should
be divided and mastered by individuals who were exercising their ‘natural’ rights
in order to improve their material situation.” Id. at 115.
13. Id. In contrast to other countries, American culture uniquely constructed
the detached single-family home as the ideal housing form and fervently protects
it through preserving the low-density, single-family residential zoning district. Id. at
7 (stating that from an international point of view, the “omnipresent” single-family
residential district is an “international rarity, historically and today”).
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residents into cities, and prompted early suburbanization.
Between 1800 and 1900, America’s urban population “increased
15
from 6 to 40 percent of the country’s total population.” In
response to growing urban nuisances, affluent city dwellers fled
16
cities for country homes in the suburbs. In effect, suburbanization
was a form of private zoning; it spatially separated desirable from
17
undesirable uses for wealthy residents. However, the advent of
automobiles and buses helped challenge suburban isolation and
18
increased the use of restrictive covenants to protect the home
19
values and the comfort of wealthy residents.
In addition to restrictive covenants, city codes and nuisance
laws helped form the legal “building blocks for municipal proto20
zoning regulations” in America. City codes regulated water supply,
21
sanitation, and housing. Nuisance laws “protect[ed] citizens only
against indisputable material harm [that] stemm[ed] from
22
excessive pollution and health hazards.” Restrictive covenants, city

14. Id. at 116–17.
15. Id. at 117 (stating that Chicago, for example, “grew from 30,000 people
in 1850 to over a million by 1890”).
16. Id. at 118. As undesirable neighbors began to crowd affluent urban
residents, the wealthy grew intolerant and moved to the suburbs. Id. at 117.
17. William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 321 (2004).
18. Restrictive covenants served as a pre-zoning, parcel-specific form of
restricting private use of land. An example of this private enforcement of separate
land uses is the use of legal racial covenants by homeowners that was in place until
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Racial restrictive covenants, for example,
segregated cities by restricting the sale of property to minority populations. HIRT,
supra note 1, at 131.
19. Fischel, supra note 17, at 326. As buses connected cities to suburbs,
commuters could deviate from streetcar lines and move into suburban
neighborhoods. Id. at 320 (“[A] crucial precondition for zoning was the spread of
a mechanically powered, intra-urban transportation system.”).
20. HIRT, supra note 1, at 130; accord 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING § 1:12, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (claiming that nuisance law
“had developed a broad pattern of restraint, and public control of private land
through legislative use of the police power was not uncommon”); see also 1 ARDEN
H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1:1, Westlaw
(database updated Nov. 2015) (discussing the forms in which land use issues could
be addressed historically, including nuisance litigation, restrictive covenants,
special-purpose regulations, and building codes, and noting that these forms still
exist today).
21. HIRT, supra note 1, at 118.
22. Id. at 119. However, unlike zoning, nuisance laws did not address the
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codes, and nuisance laws each served as pre-zoning restrictions on
private use. However, unlike zoning regulations, which sought to
regulate private use at the community level, each of these
restrictions limited private use on a case-by-case basis.
B.

Enabling Statutes: Enabling “American-Style” Zoning

The emergence of zoning laws in America fulfilled the growing
23
demand to efficiently regulate land use at the community level.
American states began to experiment with zoning laws in the 1910s
24
by enabling local and regional governments to regulate land use.
In 1915, Minnesota enacted its first “zoning” law, which “allowed
cities of the first class to create exclusive residential districts
25
through the use of eminent domain.” However, zoning that was
comprehensive, in terms of its inclusion of the whole city, first
26
emerged in New York City in 1916. Following the passage of New
“more ephemeral aspects of urban life,” such as views, light, beauty, and
preservation. Id.
23. See Fischel, supra note 17, at 320–25.
24. See id. at 319. While the rapid spread of zoning laws may be attributed to
the broad public appeal of protecting the single-family home, developers also led
the zoning movement. For example, developers of large-scale residential
subdivisions in southern California led the movement to adopt zoning laws in Los
Angeles because “covenants were insufficient to protect their property’s value
from incompatible uses on their borders.” Id. at 323–24. Even more, “[a]s
planning historian Christine Boyer points out, zoning was seen as a way to provide
‘an insurance policy that the single-family homeowner’s investment would be
protected in stable neighbourhood communities.’” Id. at 324 (quoting M.C.
BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 148
(1983)).
25. Jean L. Coleman & Suzanne Sutro Rhees, Where Land and Water Meet:
Opportunities for Integrating Minnesota Water and Land Use Planning Statutes for Water
Sustainability, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 920, 935 (2013) (citing Act of Apr. 16,
1915, ch. 128, § 1, 1915 Minn. Laws 180, 180). “Property owners in those districts
who wanted to use their property for another use, such as a commercial use or an
apartment building, had their right to develop for such uses taken by the city
through eminent domain, and were paid just compensation for their lost
development rights.” Id.
26. Fischel, supra note 17, at 318–19 (citing S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN
(1969)). Other cities also formed similar ordinances around the same time. Id.
The concept of comprehensive zoning arose from German law. See HIRT, supra
note 1, at 71. At the time, Germany was seen as the “most advanced society in
terms of municipal administration.” Id. In fact, Germany had “experimented with
urban building codes and with rules restricting the location of certain activities to
certain areas of town for a very long time.” Id.; see also George W. Liebmann, The
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York’s ordinance, eight more cities adopted zoning ordinances in
27
1916.
States delegate the authority to zone through enabling
28
legislation. In 1924, the United States Department of Commerce
29
created the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA). The Act
helped states enable local zoning codes by serving as a “blueprint
for local municipalities to enact zoning laws” and “showing
municipalities how to enact and amend zoning ordinances, as well
as how to authorize a zoning commission to propose the proper
30
legislation for zoning.”
In 1928, the United States Department of Commerce
31
published the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA). The
SCPEA served as a “companion piece to the SZEA” and required a
32
“master plan for the physical development of the municipality.”
The SZEA and the SCPEA differed primarily in relation to the role
of comprehensive planning. The SZEA required that zoning
33
ordinances “shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”
Modernization of Zoning: Enabling Act Revision as a Means to Reform, 23 URB. LAW. 1, 9
(1991).
27. Fischel, supra note 17, at 319.
28. Philip L. Fraietta, Contract and Conditional Zoning Without Romance: A
Public Choice Analysis, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1923, 1928 (2013) (“[M]unicipalities
themselves do not have police power. Police power is reserved for the state and
not for its political subdivisions. Thus, a municipality can only exercise power
‘when it has specifically or impliedly received a delegation of such power from the
state.’” (citations omitted)).
29. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 3:6 (1998). The federal government
revised the SZEA in 1926. Steven D. Villavaso, Planning Enabling Legislation in
Louisiana: A Retrospective Analysis, 45 LOY. L. REV. 655, 658 (1999).
30. Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2012). See generally Ruth Knack, Stuart Meck &
Israel Stollman, The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the
1920s, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Feb. 1996, at 3–4 (providing insight into
President Herbert Hoover’s interest in urban planning and zoning laws).
31. Salkin, supra note 30, at 267.
32. Id. (quoting AM. PLANNING ASS’N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE
GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
§ 7-110 (2002)).
33. Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 HARV. L.
REV. 1154, 1156 (1955). Interestingly, planning consultant Harald Bartholomew,
who reviewed a draft of the SZEA created this wording when he recommended the
wording be changed from “well-considered plan” to “comprehensive city plan.”
Knack, supra note 30, at 5. Further, Bartholomew stated that “[z]oning is an
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The SCPEA took planning a step further by requiring that a
comprehensive plan be followed in order to improve consistency
and limit local discretion in the application of local zoning
34
ordinances. Since the 1920s, the development of zoning and
planning has been entwined, but the exact relationship between
35
the two is still contested.
By the 1930s, the enabling acts fueled the popular demand for
36
zoning and helped spread zoning legislation to almost all states.
37
In 1926, sixty-eight cities had adopted zoning ordinances.
Between 1926 and 1936, 1,246 more municipalities across the
38
country established zoning ordinances. Zoning ordinances spread
across American municipalities rapidly; scholars have described
39
40
them as a “fad” and even a “dance craze[].” Developers wanted
zoning because it “protected the borders of covenanted land,”
which helped “induce homeowners to invest their savings in a
41
large, undiversified asset.” Homeowners wanted zoning because it
protected the value of what was likely their largest financial
essential part of the city plan” and “ought never to be considered separately” in
discussing the relationship between the Zoning Commission and a city plan
commission. Id.
34. 1 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 14:2–:3 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING AND PLANNING, STANDARD CITY PLANNING
ENABLING ACT (1928)) (discussing the SCPEA’s purpose of responding to concerns
from the implementation of SZEA and overreaching discretion of local authorities
in the zoning process).
35. Id. § 14:2; see also RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 87 (Minn. 2015) (Anderson,
J., concurring). In questioning the authority of comprehensive plans, Justice
Anderson wrote: “Our more recent cases have further confused matters by
explicitly authorizing use of comprehensive plans when making decisions on
conditional use applications, demonstrating an increased deference to
municipalities that is seemingly at odds with our holding in Zylka.” Id.
36. Salkin, supra note 30, at 267 (“By 1930, forty-seven states had adopted
zoning enabling legislation. Thirty-five states adopted enabling legislation based
on the SZEA, and ten states used the SCPEA.”) (citations omitted); Christopher
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222,
1232–33 (2009); see also Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer Bragar, Recent Developments in
Comprehensive Planning, 46 URB. LAW. 685, 685–86 n.4 (2014) (stating that while
seventy-five percent of states adopted the SZEA model, only fifty percent of states
adopted the SCPEA model).
37. Fischel, supra note 17, at 319.
38. Id.
39. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 5.
40. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 213 (2001).
41. Fischel, supra note 17, at 324–26.
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42

investment. Municipalities wanted zoning because it promoted the
tax base by “encouraging commerce while making sure that it did
not adversely affect home values and other components of the tax
43
base.”
Minnesota enabled county and township zoning through state
44
legislation in 1929. Today, two enabling acts govern zoning and
planning authority in Minnesota: the County Planning Act, passed
45
46
in 1959, and the Municipal Planning Act, passed in 1965. The
1965 Municipal Planning Act expanded the authority of
comprehensive plans to provide a “means of guiding future
47
development of land.” Additionally, the Metropolitan Land
Planning Act of 1976 defined the “structure of planning for
counties and local governments in the seven-county metropolitan
48
area.” While planning act amendments in 1985 limited the role of
comprehensive plans, the 1995 and 1997 amendments expanded

42. FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 30; Fischel, supra note 17, at 327–28 (“Having
staked their savings in their communities’ character, home-owners became a major
force in local politics. They supported zoning, which had originally been proposed
by homebuilding developers, and they made their homes the primary object to be
protected.”).
43. Fischel, supra note 17, at 324.
44. Act of Apr. 12, 1929, ch. 176, § 1, 1929 Minn. Laws 172, 172 (repealed
1965); see also Coleman & Rhees, supra note 25, at 936 (stating that towns located
within counties with populations over 450,000 people could vote to decide
whether zoning should be adopted at the municipal level). Following this initial
enabling legislation, the “Great Depression and World War II set back real estate
development, so the full impact of zoning was not felt until after World War II.”
Fischel, supra note 17, at 328.
45. Coleman & Rhees, supra note 25, at 936 (citing MINN. STAT. § 394.21
(2010 & Supp. 2011)).
46. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 462.12 (2010)).
47. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 82 (Minn. 2015) (Anderson, J., concurring)
(citing Act of May 22, 1965, ch. 670, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 995) (providing the
legislative history of comprehensive planning laws in Minnesota).
48. Coleman & Rhees, supra note 25, at 936 (citing Act of Apr. 2, 1976, ch.
127, 1976 Minn. Laws 292). As of 2014, the Twin Cities metropolitan area has a
population of 2,979,343. Community Profile for Twin Cities Region (7-county),
COUNCIL,
http://stats.metc.state.mn.us/profile/detail.aspx
METROPOLITAN
?c=R11000 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). The metropolitan area is comprised of seven
counties: Anoka County, Carver County, Dakota County, Hennepin County,
Ramsey County, Scott County, and Washington County. Community Profiles,
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://stats.metc.state.mn.us/profile/Default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 6, 2016). Bloomington, a suburb of Minneapolis, is located in
Hennepin County. Id.
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49

the role of comprehensive plans. Since 1997, the legislature has
trended towards elevating the role of comprehensive planning in
50
the zoning process.
C.

Constitutionalizing Zoning: Rigidity and Frustration with Euclidean
Zoning and the Rise of Conditional Use Permit Laws as a Tool for
Flexible Zoning

The first challenge to Minnesota’s emerging zoning codes was
51
in the 1925 case of Beery v. Houghton. In Beery, the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered whether a Minneapolis zoning
ordinance unconstitutionally restricted development of a fourfamily apartment building in a district zoned for single-family
52
homes. The court held that the city code was constitutional under
the general police powers of the state and determined that the
apartment unit contradicted municipal efforts to improve living
53
conditions in the city. Notably, Beery helped establish the
constitutional source for zoning power as distinct from the power

49. See RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 83.
50. Id.
51. 164 Minn. 146, 147, 204 N.W. 569, 569 (1925).
52. Id. at 147–50, 204 N.W. at 569–70 (“By the comprehensive zoning
ordinance of Minneapolis, a district is created in which the erection of four-family
flat buildings is prohibited . . . . Whether the ordinance is constitutional is the
question . . . . With the crowding of population in the cities, there is an active
insistence upon the establishment of residential districts from which annoying
occupations, and buildings undesirable to the community, are excluded.”).
53. Id. at 151, 204 N.W. at 570–71. In Beery, the court quotes Justice Holt
from a 1919 opinion:
Our elaborate Housing Code of 1917 is an illustration of an effort on
the part of the state, through the exercise of the police power, to so
regulate the construction of buildings that living conditions shall be
better . . . . It must be admitted that owners of land in congested cities
have of late, through selfish and unworthy motives, put it to such use
that serious inconvenience and loss results to other landowners in the
neighborhood . . . . [I]t is readily seen that if a home is built on such a
lot and thereafter three-story apartments extending to the lot line are
constructed on both sides of the home it becomes almost unlivable and
its value utterly destroyed. Not only that, but the construction of such
apartments or other like buildings in a territory of individual homes
depreciates very much the values in the whole territory.
Id. at 149, 204 N.W. at 570 (quoting State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 18–19, 174
N.W. 159, 161–62 (1919)).
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54

of eminent domain. Operating through a state’s police powers,
zoning regulations may constitute a regulatory taking, but not
55
necessarily.
A year later, in the landmark decision Euclid v. Ambler Realty
56
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Co.,
57
58
constitutionality of zoning ordinances. In a facial challenge, the
59
Court applied rational basis review and held that zoning
60
unless the
ordinances were presumptively constitutional
ordinance was “arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
61
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”
62
In effect, “Euclidean zoning” provided predictable and efficient

54. Id. at 147, 204 N.W. at 569. (“The public use, which sustains the taking of
property under the power of eminent domain upon compensation paid, differs
from the public interest or welfare which justifies the restriction of the individual
in the use of his property without compensation.”).
55. See, e.g., Mark S. Dennison & Steven M. Silverberg, Overview of Regulatory
Takings Law, in 31 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 2, Westlaw (database updated Dec.
2015).
56. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
57. Id. (“[A]s it must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”); see also Fischel, supra note 17, at 319 (“Euclid’s victory cleared the way
for zoning in almost all of the state courts, which had been about evenly split on
the constitutionality of zoning up to 1926.”).
58. While Euclid determined that zoning ordinances were constitutional in
general, the Court held in Nectow v. City of Cambridge that zoning ordinances may
be unconstitutional as applied. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
59. In its support for regulation, Euclid may be viewed as an anomaly in
Lochner era substantive due process interpretation, where the Court often struck
down regulation of private business. See Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty,
Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 432, 459 (2005). But see Nadav
Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the
Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 112 (2011) (citing ROBERT
G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 87–90, 101–05 (4th ed. 2005)
(arguing that in the zoning context, the Lochner court was more pragmatic than is
often credited).
60. See Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741 (2004) (contending Euclid shifted the presumption
for noncompliant uses from legitimate to illegitimate).
61. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
62. 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 98, Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2015) (“‘Euclidean zoning’ describes the early zoning concept of separating
incompatible land uses through the establishment of fixed legislative rules . . . .”).
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land use regulations by simply defining uses as conforming and
63
nonconforming to a zoning district’s “appropriate” use.
Euclidean zoning’s rigid structure of conforming and
nonconforming uses provided predictability for developers, but
frustrated municipalities. With variances as the only available device
64
to accommodate nonconforming uses, cities were unable to
65
develop important public amenities and services for residents. In
response to these problems, by the 1960s, tools for flexibility in the
zoning process had expanded, local discretion had grown, and
66
uncertainty in the zoning process had increased.
CUPs, also referred to as special-use permits or special
67
exceptions, were developed to provide more flexibility and
68
discretion for municipalities after World War II. CUP laws enabled
63. See Shoked, supra note 59, at 143 (“Euclid placed the right to security in
landholding, to quiet enjoyment of the homestead, at the forefront—at the
expense of free exploitation of property and commercial expansion.”); see also
Claeys, supra note 60, at 741 (“Each local owner los[t] substantial freedom to
control the use of his own parcel of land, but gain[ed] the opportunity to vote on
how his neighbors ought to use their properties.”).
64. Variances are a “distinct remedy” from CUPs. 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM.
LAW. ZONING § 13:2 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). Unlike
CUPs, variances relate to noncomforming uses. Id. In other words, “[v]ariances are
essentially an authorization to deviate from the terms of an applicable zoning
ordinance.” Id.
65. Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning That Is
Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 389 (2004)
(“This rigidity of Euclidean zoning came at the expense of flexibility, allowing for
little modification or adoption of regulations to particular uses within zones.
Moreover, the assumptions underlying Euclidean zoning were incorrect.
Euclidean zoning underestimated the effects of the dynamism of a growing
economy and rapidly changing technologies in private preferences and municipal
needs, and it overestimated the ability of officials to anticipate market demand for
new uses.”).
66. Fraietta, supra note 28, at 1927 (“Although Euclidean zoning provided
for changes and variances, it was envisioned that discretionary review of individual
proposed use would be the ‘exception’ rather than the rule and that zoning
restrictions would be uniform for each kind of building in each district.”).
67. While CUPs are one device that developed to promote flexibility in
zoning, other tools that have developed include: “floating zones, cluster zoning,
planned unit developments (PUDs), transfer of development rights (TDRs), and
‘performance zoning.’” RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY,
LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 197 (3d ed. 2014). Before these devices existed, the only
way to address nonconforming uses were through amendments and variances. Id.
68. See BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 5; see also 1 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 20, §
1:14; Green, supra note 65, at 388 (arguing that the CUP process was more
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localities to permit certain uses in specific areas—typically for
hospitals, schools, landfills, or golf courses—but held development
for these uses contingent upon approval by a local governing
69
body. Because these uses often raised issues with traffic, noise,
odor, property values, and population density, the CUP process
allowed local governing bodies to consider each use on a case-bycase basis to balance the interests of the applicant and surrounding
70
property owners. Unlike variances, conditional uses were seen as
allowable uses, but only if certain conditions were met to ensure
compatibility with surrounding uses, such as the omnipresent low71
density, single-family residential district.
When the CUP process started to gain popularity in American
zoning, the process was met with “much criticism” because many
believed it ran “counter to the principle that zoning is a specific,
72
not discretionary, form of control.” Initial objections to the CUP
73
related to the lack of specific standards for conditional uses.
These complaints encouraged legislation to require specifications
74
for how a CUP application determination would be made.
efficient than rezoning, which was a more “cumbersome legislative process”);
Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 879 (1983); Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to
Growing Smart: The Transformation of the American Local Land Use Ethic into Local
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 118 (2002).
69. See 3 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 20, § 61:4; see also 3 SALKIN, supra note
64, § 18:62 (discussing special-use permits for nursing homes and assisted-living
facilities).
70. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 195–96, 167 N.W.2d 45, 48–49
(1969); Amoco Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 395 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
71. BEVERLY J. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1961)
(“[W]hereas variances are granted in order to save the constitutionality of the
ordinance in cases where its operation would cause special hardship, the
exception is intended to further the needs of the community, and not to alleviate
the hardship of individual owners.”).
72. JOHN DELAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (2d ed.
1969). But see POOLEY, supra note 71, at 66 (arguing that the exceptions actually
reduced the “amount of discretion in the hands of the zoning board of appeals,
since that body merely has to find whether, as a matter of fact, the application is
properly within the scope of the ordinance’s provisions with respect to the
granting of special exceptions, and whether the proposed development will accord
with the requirements of the master plan”).
73. DELAFONS, supra note 72, at 51–52 (attributing the demand for precise
specifications to “American distrust for bureaucratic power”).
74. See id.
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In Zylka v. City of Crystal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a city only had the authority to deny a CUP that was not in
accordance with the city’s zoning ordinance or the public’s general
welfare, and a city had to demonstrate that the decision was not
75
made arbitrarily. According to the court, a “special-use-permit”
was “an authorized zoning tool designed not merely for nuisance
control but to provide municipalities with broad latitude to meet
76
the changing problems of land-use control . . . .” Although the
zoning enabling statute did not “expressly confer upon
municipalities the power to provide for special-use permits, such
power [was] clearly implicit” in Minnesota Statutes section 462.357,
77
subdivision 1. The statute read: “For the purpose of promoting
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, a municipality
may by ordinance regulate . . . the uses of land for trade [and]
industry . . . and may establish standards and procedures regulating such
78
uses.”
Zylka sent the message to developers that municipalities had
broad discretion to deny a proposed use through a CUP denial.
However, the case was also a reminder to local authorities that a
decision must be made on some basis in line with the general
welfare. Subsequent case law and legislation worked to provide
developers with greater predictability and efficiency in obtaining
CUPs by defining appropriate municipal discretion.
In 1982, thirteen years after Zylka, the Minnesota legislature
passed its first CUP legislation, codified in Minnesota Statutes
section 462.3595. The statute (1) affirmed municipal power to
79
designate conditional uses, (2) granted municipal discretion to
grant or deny a CUP, (3) placed the burden on the CUP applicant
to demonstrate that the “standards and criteria stated in the
80
ordinance [would] be satisfied,” and (4) limited municipal
discretion by requiring “standards and criteria” for conditional uses

75. Zylka, 283 Minn. at 196, 167 N.W.2d at 49.
76. Id. at 196–97, 167 N.W.2d at 49.
77. Id. at 196, 167 N.W.2d at 49.
78. MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subdiv. 1 (1968) (emphasis added).
79. MINN. STAT. § 462.3595 (1982). Specifically, the statute emphasized the
ability of municipalities to “designate certain types of developments, including
planned unit developments, and certain land development activities as conditional
uses under zoning regulations.” Id. at subdiv. 1.
80. Id. at subdiv. 1.
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81

and variances. To decrease the discretion of local authorities, the
statute required that “standards and criteria shall include both
general requirements for all conditional uses, and insofar as
practicable, requirements specific to each designated conditional
82
83
use.” The bill passed through the legislature without dispute.
D.

The Role of the Judiciary in the Zoning Process: Standard of Review

While a city has broad discretionary power to deny a CUP, as
84
determined in Zylka, the permit process is considered quasi85
judicial and courts may review denials. It is the applicant’s burden
to demonstrate that the “standards and criteria stated in the
86
ordinance will be satisfied” by a proposed use. However, the
“absence of more express standards makes denial of a special-use
87
permit more, not less, vulnerable to a finding of arbitrariness.” A
court may reverse a decision if the governing body acted
88
“unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously.” In deference to the
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. The 1982 Journal of the Senate, in its description of the bill, stated that it
was “[a] bill for an act relating to local government . . . requiring notice;
authorizing towns to plan; providing for [legal] standards and criteria for
conditional uses and variances . . . .” S. JOURNAL, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4141
(Minn. 1982). This author went to the Minnesota Historical Society’s Gale Family
Library in Saint Paul, Minnesota, to conduct a legislative history; the Commerce
Committee minutes do not indicate that the CUP section of the bill was ever
contested or revised during the 1982 session.
84. See BECA of Alexandria, L.L.P. v. Cty. of Douglas Bd. of Comm’rs, 607
N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a court “may not substitute its
judgment” for a local governing body “if there is a legally sufficient reason for the
decision, even if it would have reached a different conclusion”).
85. See BBY Inv’rs v. City of Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (arguing that court may review the CUP denial because the process is
“quasi-judicial,” meaning that a local governing body must apply specific standards
of a local ordinance to a particular proposed use, which may be evaluated by the
court to ensure it was done correctly).
86. See, e.g., Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 763
(Minn. 1982); Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303
Minn. 79, 84, 226 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1975), superceded by statute, MINN. STAT.
§ 462.3595 (2014), as recognized in RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015);
Roselawn Cemetery v. City of Roseville, 689 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004).
87. Hay v. Twp. of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 6, 206 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1973).
88. Schwardt v. Cty. of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003); see also
Dead Lake Ass’n v. Otter Tail Cty., 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn. 2005).
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89

legislature, a court’s role is only to interpret a zoning ordinance
and ensure that a local governing body “was not mistaken as to the
90
applicable law.” Zoning ordinances must be interpreted by their
91
“plain and ordinary meaning and in favor of the property owner.”
A court considers (1) whether a city provides “legally sufficient”
reasons to deny a CUP and, if so, (2) whether the reasons have a
92
“factual basis.”
Traffic concerns may be considered a “legally sufficient”
93
reason to deny a CUP. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has emphasized that “traffic, in itself, is not injurious or harmful,”
94
and increased traffic is “far from the creation of a traffic hazard.”
Even more, courts have held that zoning ordinances should not be
used “as a primary means of regulating traffic or [an attempt] to
95
reduce traffic congestion.” For traffic concerns “to be considered
89. But cf. Big Lake Ass’n v. Saint Louis Cty. Planning Comm’n, 761 N.W.2d
487, 491 (Minn. 2009) (finding denials of CUPs receive less deference than
approvals).
90. Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608
(Minn. 1980); Vill. of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 98, 119 N.W.2d 809, 815
(1962); see also Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 718
(Minn. 1978).
91. Yang v. Cty. of Carver, 660 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Frank’s Nursery Sales, 295 N.W.2d at 608).
92. C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981);
Molnar v. Cty. of Carver Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997); Trisko v. City of Waite Park, 566 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating review is limited to the reasons stated by the city).
93. 1 SALKIN, supra note 64, § 7:9. While many zoning enabling acts in states
borrowed “language from § 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,” which
authorized “the adoption in zoning regulations which tend ‘to lessen congestion
in the streets,’” neither Minnesota’s current enabling statute nor Minnesota’s 1965
Municipal Zoning Act referred specifically to controlling traffic as within the
police powers of the state. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 462.351 (2014); Act of May 22,
1965, ch. 670, 1965 Minn. Laws 995 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 462.351
(1966)). Minnesota’s enabling act referred to the police powers broadly by stating
that municipalities need to “promote the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare.” MINN. STAT. § 462.351.
94. Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303 Minn.
79, 226 N.W.2d 306 (1975), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 3595 (2014), as
recognized in RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing the change to
the burden of proof standard, but not neighborhood opposition); see also 83 AM.
JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 845, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (stating
adverse impact of traffic on neighborhood may be considered, but “should not be
given great weight”).
95. 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.09, at 749
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evidence in favor of a [CUP] denial, [traffic] concerns must be
96
concrete in nature, not vague concerns about future traffic.” The
testimony cannot be “general statements about congestion” or
97
“anecdotal comments” regarding traffic. However, testimony is
considered “concrete” if it addresses “existing, daily traffic
98
problems” or reflects “actual observations of traffic congestion or
99
potential traffic impact.”
Alone, neighborhood opposition testimony—based on traffic
concerns or other potential problems—may not be considered a
100
“sufficient factual basis” to deny a CUP application.
It is
101
undisputed that neighbors may express opposition. However, the
weight of neighborhood opposition in the decision process is
limited. Arguably, Minnesota has a more rigorous standard for
neighborhood opposition cases than other states, taking a more
102
“suspicious” view of neighborhood opposition. For instance, in
Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held “non-specific testimony” that a
“proposed McDonald’s pose[d] potential traffic hazards” could not
“rebut the city engineer’s testimony that the intersection could
103
handle the anticipated traffic.” In this ruling, the court held that
a CUP denial “must be based on something more concrete than
neighborhood opposition and expressions of concern for public
104
safety and welfare.” Going even further, in Northpointe Plaza v. City
(4th ed. 1996).
96. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington (RDNT I), No. 27-CV-12-791, 2012
WL 12139702, at *9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 2012) (citing SuperAmerica Grp.,
Inc., v. City of Little Canada 539 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)); see also
Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 833–34.
97. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington (RDNT II), No. A13-0310, 2014 WL
30382, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2014), aff’d, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015)
(quoting Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 834).
98. SuperAmerica Grp., 539 N.W.2d at 267–68.
99. Bartheld v. Cty. of Koochiching, 716 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006).
100. See Yang, 660 N.W.2d at 833–34.
101. See SuperAmerica Grp., 539 N.W.2d at 268.
102. See Harold A. Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of
Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 298 (1992).
103. 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984).
104. Id.; see also C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325
(Minn. 1981); Luger v. City of Burnsville, 295 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Minn. 1980)
(“Although neighborhood sentiment may be taken into consideration in any
zoning decision, it may not constitute the sole base for granting or denying a given
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of Rochester, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that
neighborhood opposition based on traffic concerns was insufficient
105
to deny a CUP to construct a gas station.
However, in
SuperAmerica Group, Inc., v. City of Little Canada, the court of appeals
found that expert testimony supporting neighborhood opposition
testimony about traffic congestion was a legally sufficient basis to
106
deny a CUP.
The courts’ “suspicion” of neighborhood opposition testimony
in these cases is highlighted by a comparison to the United States
Supreme Court case City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
107
Center. Whereas “the Minnesota paradigm . . . seems to trigger
presumption shifting, regardless of whether the motives of
neighbors and decisionmakers were innocent,” Cleburne only shifts
the burden when there is a “showing” that the denial “was
108
animated by illicit motives or impermissible purposes.” Minnesota
case law continues to maintain that neighborhood opposition
109
alone cannot be grounds for CUP denial.
Additionally, if a local governing body does not adequately
consider proposed mitigating conditions that would bring a CUP
application into compliance with a local ordinance, a CUP denial
may be considered arbitrary and not based on a sufficient “factual
110
basis.” If a city bases a decision on neighborhood opposition
testimony more than on the proposed mitigating conditions, a
a permit.” (quoting Nw. Coll. v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn.
1979))).
105. 457 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 465 N.W.2d 686
(Minn. 1991).
106. SuperAmerica Grp., 539 N.W.2d at 268.
107. Ellis, supra note 102, at 297 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
108. Id. at 297–98.
109. Minnesota case law maintains that neighborhood opposition may be
considered as a factual basis if it is concrete and specific. Furthermore, Chanhassen
and additional cases emphasize that neighborhood opposition alone cannot be a
factual basis for CUP denial. See infra Part IV.A.
110. Compare C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn.
1981) (plan to alleviate parking and traffic concerns was adequate), and Trisko v.
City of Waite Park, 566 N.W.2d 349, 355–57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (working with
Department of Transportation to address traffic concerns considered adequate),
with In re Application of Stuckmayer, No. A09-30, 2009 WL 4910053, at *6 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (local board ignored a proposed condition), and
duCharme v. Otter Tail Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A08-0529, 2009 WL 1851445, at
*4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (local board gave no reasons for denial).
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111

court may find a CUP denial arbitrary. In Tri-City Paving, Inc. v.
Cass County Planning Commission/Board of Adjustment, for example,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that “[i]f the board’s findings
were specific and factually supported in consideration of the
conditions, its reasons for denial would survive our deferential
112
review.”
Overall, Minnesota courts demonstrate a cautious approach to
neighborhood opposition testimony serving as a “factual basis” for
a CUP denial. Courts refuse to accept neighborhood opposition as
(1) the sole “factual basis” for a CUP denial, and (2) the primary
consideration over proposed mitigating conditions.
III. THE RDNT DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

On September 27, 2011, RDNT, LLC (RDNT) applied to the
City of Bloomington (City) for a CUP to add a three-story, sixtyseven unit assisted living facility to its Martin Luther Care Campus
113
(Campus). Located along the Minnesota River, “[t]he [C]ampus
is surrounded on its east, south, and west sides by dense
114
woodlands.” Traffic can only access the facility from the north by
115
passing through a residential neighborhood. As a care facility,
116
The
“the [C]ampus is designated [as a] quasi-public” use.
Campus already includes a 137-unit skilled nursing facility and a
117
117-unit assisted living facility.
According to RDNT, the
expansion would enable transitional care residents to “age in
111. See Tri-City Paving, Inc. v. Cass Cty. Planning Comm’n/Bd. of
Adjustment, No. A11-2054, 2012 WL 4475742, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012).
112. Id.
113. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 72–73 (Minn. 2015).
114. RDNT II, No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 30382, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6,
2014), aff’d, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015).
115. Id. (“Approximately 80 percent of the traffic to and from the campus is
carried by 13th Avenue South. The remainder of the traffic to and from the
campus is carried by East 100th Street, to the east of its intersection with 13th
Avenue South.”). Interestingly, the Campus—built “over 50 years ago” for elder
care—preceded the residential neighborhood, which was later built on the
Campus’s subdivided excess land. As stated in RDNT’s reply brief, “the residents
moved into the Campus’ neighborhood.” Appellant’s Reply Brief & Addendum at
13, RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 71 (No. A13-0310), 2014 WL 8392639, at *13.
116. RDNT II, 2014 WL 30382, at *8.
117. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 73.
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place,” allowing residents to transfer into assisted living without
118
leaving the Campus.
In November 2011, the Bloomington Planning Commission
“unanimously voted to recommend denial of the [CUP]
application” after neighborhood residents “voic[ed] concerns
119
about increased traffic.”
After considering the Planning
Commission’s denial, expert traffic studies, and neighborhood
opposition testimony, the City denied the CUP application,
concluding that the proposed use violated the City’s
120
comprehensive plan and CUP ordinance. The City reasoned that
(1) the facility’s size would be “incompatible with the scale and
character of the surrounding low density, single family
neighborhood;” (2) the traffic volume would be “injurious or
otherwise harmful;” and (3) RDNT’s traffic mitigation plan was
“insufficient to avoid the injury, given the location and nature of
121
the Campus.”
122
RDNT appealed to the Hennepin County District Court. The
court granted summary judgment to RDNT, ruling that the City
“misapplied certain standards, misrepresented the impact of
certain studies, and appeared to ignore evidence to the contrary”
123
for each of the reasons asserted by the City. Moreover, the court

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 73–74 (“By a vote of four to three, the City Council passed a
resolution to deny RDNT’s application for a conditional use permit.”). The
Bloomington City CUP Ordinance reads:
The following findings must be made prior to the approval of a
conditional use permit: (1) The proposed use is not in conflict with the
Comprehensive Plan; (2) The proposed use is not in conflict with any
adopted District Plan for the area; (3) The proposed use is not in
conflict with City Code provisions; (4) The proposed use will not create
an excessive burden on parks, schools, streets, and other public
facilities and utilities which serve or are proposed to serve the planned
development; and (5) The proposed use will not be injurious to the
surrounding neighborhood or otherwise harm the public health, safety
and welfare.
Id. (citing BLOOMINGTON, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 21, art. V, div. A,
§ 21.501.04(e) (2013)).
121. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 74–75.
122. Id. at 75.
123. RDNT I, No. 27-CV-12-791, 2012 WL 12139702, at *8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec.
18, 2012).
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held that City’s denial “was based on analysis of inapplicable
124
standards and improper overemphasis of certain statistics.”
The City appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
125
reversed. The court held that the city council acted within its
discretion because violation of the City’s comprehensive plan and
the City’s CUP ordinance constituted factually and legally sufficient
126
reasons for a CUP denial. In its reversal, the court relied on two
factors. First, the court held that the proposed expansion violated
the City’s comprehensive plan because it constituted a “larger
traffic generator” that was not “located adjacent to an arterial or
127
collector street.” Second, the court determined that the increased
traffic from the proposed expansion would disturb the “character”
of the surrounding “low-density neighborhoods” and injure the
general welfare of the surrounding neighborhoods, in violation of
128
the comprehensive plan and CUP ordinance.
RDNT appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted
129
review. On review, RDNT argued two main points of contention:
(1) whether the record supported the conclusion that increased
traffic “would injure the surrounding neighborhood or otherwise
harm the public health, safety and welfare,” and (2) whether the
City’s denial was arbitrary because the City did not “suggest or
impose mitigating conditions” or “adequately consider RDNT’s
130
proposed mitigating conditions.” After considering the facts and
the law, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of

124. Id. at *9.
125. RDNT II, No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 30382, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 6,
2014), aff’d, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015).
126. Id. at *5, *8–9.
127. Id. at *4 (“The comprehensive plan does not define the term ‘larger
traffic generator.’ The plain meaning of the word ‘larger’ connotes a comparison
in terms of size or quantity. Thus, the city is justified in comparing the traffic
produced by the campus with the traffic produced by the residential
neighborhood directly north of the campus.”).
128. Id. at *9 (“The [C]ity cited three specific aspects of RDNT’s expansion
that would cause injury to the surrounding neighborhood. These three grounds
are the same as those cited by the [C]ity with respect to the character of the
surrounding low-density neighborhood. For the same reasons . . . stated above, we
conclude that the city had both a legally and factually sufficient basis for denying
RDNT’s CUP application based on concerns for the health and welfare of the
surrounding neighborhood.”).
129. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015).
130. Id. at 76, 78.
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appeal’s decision, holding that the City acted within its discretion
131
by denying RDNT a CUP.
B.

The Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
132

The Minnesota Supreme Court
limited review to
determining whether there were “legally and factually sufficient”
grounds to deny RDNT’s CUP based on a violation of the City’s
133
CUP ordinance. First, the court maintained that protecting “the
public health or safety or the general welfare of the area affected or
the community as a whole” has long been considered a legally
134
sufficient reason to deny a CUP application. Although suggesting
that the “absence of more express standards makes denial of a
special-use permit more, not less, vulnerable to a finding of
135
arbitrariness,”
the court concluded—without analysis—that
violation of Bloomington’s CUP ordinance was a legally sufficient
136
reason to deny a CUP.
Second, the court reasoned that there was a “sufficient factual
basis” to conclude that the proposed use would harm the
neighborhood because increased traffic volume would aggravate
137
existing traffic problems. Distinguishing its decision from C.R.
138
Investments, Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, the court found that unlike
C.R. Investments, Inc., neighborhood testimony “gave concrete
testimony about how the increase in traffic would exacerbate
139
existing traffic conditions.” Specifically, the court emphasized the
poor traffic behavior in the neighborhood:
131. Id. at 79.
132. Justice Christopher Dietzen did not partake in the court’s decision. Id.
Justice G. Barry Anderson’s concurring opinion accepts the majority’s holding, but
writes separately to raise concerns about “significant uncertainty in our statutory
framework and confusion in our case law concerning the role of comprehensive
plans.” Id. (Anderson, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 75 n.3 (“Not all of the reasons stated need to be legally sufficient
and supported by the facts in the record.” (quoting Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of
Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 765 n.4 (Minn. 1982))).
134. Id. at 76 (quoting Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196, 167 N.W.2d
45, 49 (1969)).
135. Id. (quoting Hay v. Twp. of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 6, 206 N.W.2d 19, 22–23
(1973)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 77.
138. 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981).
139. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77.
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For instance, one neighbor wrote about vehicles driving
through crosswalks near the school, even though the
crossing guards had their flags out. Another neighbor
wrote about observing vehicles that sped and made Uturns. Yet another neighbor wrote about the incredible
amount of “traffic and noise” due to the large number of
delivery trucks, emergency vehicles, shuttle buses,
140
passenger cars, and garbage vehicles.
The court further distinguished its decision from C.R.
Investments, Inc. based on the source of the neighborhood
141
In C.R.
opposition and the degree of the traffic concern.
Investments, Inc., the court found that the “only evidence of a traffic
control problem” was a “statement of one council member” who
had been informed about “a problem existing at one intersection
and his opinion that additional housing units might aggravate that
142
problem.” However, in the present case, the court reasoned
143
multiple residents raised traffic concerns at various locations.
Further supporting its argument that the City had a “sufficient
factual basis,” the court distinguished its decision from Chanhassen
144
Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen. In Chanhassen, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the CUP denial was arbitrary
where the city engineer concluded that the “intersection could
handle the traffic,” but neighborhood opposition “only offered
‘non-specific testimony that the proposed [use] pose[d] potential
145
traffic hazards at [an] intersection.’” The city engineer in the
present case also determined the city’s “streets were not at
146
capacity.” In contrast to the city’s arguments in Chanhassen, the
City of Bloomington swayed the court through “specific evidence—
traffic studies, average street numbers, and neighborhood
testimony . . . that the proposed use” would harm the general
147
welfare of the neighborhood. The court’s reasoning linked
projected increased traffic to negative impact on the

140. Id.
141. Id.; see C.R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325.
142. C.R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325.
143. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77.
144. Id. (citing Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, 342
N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984))
145. Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d at 340.
146. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77.
147. Id.

9 (Do Not Delete)

342

3/24/2016 7:57 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:320

148

neighborhood’s future livability. The court held that although “a
street could physically handle more traffic,” that did not mean “the
149
neighborhood or the public could handle more traffic.”
Finally, the court rejected RDNT’s argument that the City
arbitrarily found RDNT’s proposed mitigating conditions to be
150
insufficient. In its reasoning, the court again distinguished its
decision from C.R. Investments Inc., where the Minnesota Supreme
Court held a village council’s decision arbitrary when it ignored the
reasonable condition of adding “turn-around areas in . . .
151
driveways” that would eliminate a traffic hazard. In considering
the added condition that eliminated the impact of increased traffic,
the C.R. Investments Inc. court held that it could no longer find
“evidence warranting an inference that the traffic aggravation
152
would be ‘substantial.’” In RDNT, however, the court concluded
that the traffic studies examining increased traffic volume
“adequately considered” the proposed conditions by RDNT and
showed that even with the conditions, traffic volume would still
increase and therefore the conditions would “not alleviate the
153
traffic concerns.”
The court did not differentiate between
mitigating conditions that would decrease the volume of traffic and
conditions that would minimize the impact of increased traffic.
Therefore, the court held that the City acted within its
discretion to deny RDNT’s CUP application because the City had a
154
“legally and factually sufficient” reason.

148. Id. (“Not unreasonably, the City determined that street capacity alone
was not dispositive as to whether an increase in traffic injures the neighborhood or
otherwise harms the public health, safety, and welfare.”).
149. Id. (paraphrasing a city planner, “[T]his is not a capacity issue, it is a
livability issue.”).
150. Id. at 78 (stating that section 462.3595 placed the burden on the
applicant to show compliance with the ordinance and the City did not have the
burden of proposing mitigating conditions).
151. C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981)
(“The council had been informed, however, that the road could accommodate
increased traffic, and appellant can eliminate any hazard from automobile backing
onto the road by furnishing turn-around areas in the driveways.”).
152. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 78 (quoting C.R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325).
153. Id. at 78–79.
154. Id. at 72.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In error, the Minnesota Supreme Court (1) solely relied on
neighborhood opposition to conclude that the traffic from the
proposed use would harm the surrounding neighborhood’s
livability and (2) ignored material mitigating conditions proposed
by RDNT to improve traffic impact. First, despite the court’s
emphasis that the problem was not capacity, but livability, only the
155
neighborhood opposition testimony addressed livability. Second,
the court failed to consider RDNT’s proposed conditions to
minimize the impact of increased traffic by only interpreting
156
conditions that would minimize traffic volume.
Consequently, the court broadly expanded Minnesota law
regarding what may be considered a “factually sufficient” basis for
denying a CUP based on injurious traffic, lowering the burden of
proof for municipalities and disregarding potential public value of
a proposed use. The impact of this expanded municipal discretion
in development may present undue barriers to the development of
important quasi-public uses, such as care facilities for Minnesota’s
157
expanding elderly population. The court’s holding enforced a
process that does not adequately consider the residential needs of
the aging versus the needs of the powerful lobby of single-family
homeowners. By conflating traffic impact and traffic volume, the
court unfettered neighborhood opposition based on traffic
concerns and deviated from the state’s rigorous standard in
considering neighborhood opposition.
A.

Neighborhood Opposition to Traffic Impact

Even accepting the court’s conclusion that the neighborhood
opposition evidence was “concrete” and based on existing, daily
traffic problems, the court cannot rely on these statements alone to
158
support the claim that traffic would harm the neighborhood. In

155. Id. at 77.
156. Id. at 78–79; see C. R. Invs., Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325.
157. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table
/PST045214/27 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (showing that from 2010 to 2014, the
number of Minnesotans over the age of sixty-five increased from 12.9 to 14.3
percent).
158. See Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, 342
N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) (holding a valid denial of a CUP requires more
than non-specific testimony, such as mere neighborhood opposition or concern
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RDNT, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that expert traffic
studies adequately considered the increase in traffic and the
inability of the proposed mitigating conditions to alleviate the
159
amount of traffic. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
consider whether the expert traffic studies, or other evidence,
confirmed the neighborhood observations regarding the current
160
impact of traffic.
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished its decision from
Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen to
demonstrate the authority of the neighborhood opposition
161
testimony. The court distinguished the cases based on the degree
of strength of neighborhood opposition testimony and expert
162
testimony. In Chanhassen, the neighborhood opposition was weak,
163
based on “non-specific” concerns for the general welfare. The
minimal expert testimony regarding the street’s capacity overrode
164
the weaker neighborhood opposition testimony. However, in
RDNT, the neighborhood opposition was strong, based on multiple
165
accounts of specific concerns about public safety and nuisance.
Unlike in Chanhassen, the extensive expert testimony regarding
traffic volume in RDNT did not override the well-asserted
neighborhood opposition because, according to the court, any
166
increase in volume would exacerbate existing livability concerns.
Chanhassen established that neighborhood opposition may be
considered if the testimony is concrete and specific. However,
Chanhassen did not help clarify the type and degree of expert
testimony needed to support or deny a CUP. Subsequent case law

for public safety).
159. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 73–74.
160. See id. at 77 (explaining that the City appropriately relied on “traffic
studies, average street numbers, and neighborhood testimony—to conclude that
the proposed use would nonetheless injure or otherwise harm the
neighborhood”).
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 79 (“Even if URS’s estimates regarding traffic generation and
the [Transportation Demand Management Program’s] effectiveness were
accurate, the expansion would still add over 100 daily trips. Thus, the City had a
reasonable factual basis to determine that the proposal would not alleviate the
traffic concerns.”).
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helps clarify the relationship between neighborhood opposition
and expert testimony; the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
167
analyze this law.
Even if traffic testimony is specific, Minnesota courts maintain
168
a “suspicious” attitude toward neighborhood opposition.
Although “municipalities may consider bordering residents’
concerns to zoning issues,” the neighborhood opposition needs to
169
be “specific and backed by other concrete evidence.” In other
words, the law states that if there is neighborhood opposition
testimony about a given concern, there needs to be something to
substantiate the specific claims. In this respect, RDNT departs from
precedent. For example, in SuperAmerica Group, Inc. v. City of Little
Canada, expert testimony directly confirmed residents’ observations
about long delays resulting from existing traffic congestion at one
170
intersection. In SuperAmerica, the court focused on the expert’s
conclusions regarding the impact of the traffic congestion—not
traffic volume alone—to conclude the proposed use would harm
171
the public’s general welfare.
However, in RDNT, neighborhood opposition was the sole
evidence of traffic harming the neighborhood in the court’s
172
rationale.
This represents a misstep in Minnesota law
surrounding CUPs. Although neighborhood opposition may be

167. Yang v. Cty. of Carver, 660 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(allowing cities to consider neighborhood opposition if it is based on concrete
information).
168. See Ellis, supra note 102, at 297–98.
169. Hanson v. Cty. of Carver Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A05-2047, 2006 WL
2598283, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Swanson
v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 1988); Yang, 660 N.W.2d at
833 (claiming that the neighborhood opposition testimony was “insufficiently
concrete to substantiate a finding that the proposed use would create excess
traffic”); SuperAmerica Grp., Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 539 N.W.2d 264, 267
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
170. 539 N.W.2d at 268 (describing expert testimony that supported claims,
albeit potentially exaggerated claims, of traffic congestion at the intersection: “(1)
making a left turn from the site onto Little Canada Road was extremely difficult,
and often impossible, due to traffic congestion; (2) many vehicles had to wait two
cycles at the stoplight before completing a turn . . .”).
171. Id. It is unclear whether the gas station proposed any mitigating
conditions to alleviate the burden of increased traffic; mitigating conditions were
not discussed in the opinion. See id.
172. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 77 (Minn. 2015).
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considered, it must also be confirmed by other evidence. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that “traffic studies” and “average
street numbers” were sufficient evidence to support the
174
neighborhood opposition testimony.
However, the court’s
analysis of the expert studies focused solely on increased volume of
traffic. For example, the court considered only “trip generation
175
rates” and the “daily number of trips.” Thus, the RDNT court,
unlike the Minnesota Court of Appeals in SuperAmerica, relied on
specific neighborhood opposition, but no “other concrete
176
evidence” regarding the impact of traffic.
Ultimately, the RDNT court’s rationale expands the ability of
neighborhood opposition to influence CUP denials. Conflating
capacity and livability traffic concerns in considering neighborhood
opposition testimony undermines a long history of balancing the
interests of homeowners and developers. Predictability comes from
limits on discretion, which may strengthen a developer’s ability to
plan in accordance with zoning law. Furthermore, predictability
enables developers to create mitigating conditions to improve the
impact of traffic. Because new development will likely increase the
volume of traffic, the real concern should be about the impact of
development on traffic and the ability of the developers to mitigate
the impact of increased volume and alleviate the burdens of
existing traffic concerns.
B.

RDNT’s Proposed Mitigating Conditions to Improve Livability

The Minnesota Supreme Court erred by only considering
RDNT’s proposed mitigating conditions that would reduce traffic
volume and not considering proposed improvements that sought
to manage the impact of traffic. The court considered the
Campus’s Transportation Demand Management Program (TDMP)
to determine whether the proposed mitigating conditions would
177
exacerbate existing traffic concerns.
Similar to the court’s
reliance on increased trip volume by the expert studies, the court

173. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
174. RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 77.
175. Id. at 73–74, 76.
176. The court did consider the city’s engineer’s opinion “that the public tends
to complain once traffic increases to 1,000 trips per day on such a street. Thus . . .
there is a factual basis in the record . . . .” Id. at 76.
177. Id. at 78.
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focused specifically on the “measures designed to reduce the
number of new and existing trips generated by the Campus” in
178
analyzing the TDMP.
Although the court emphasized that the neighborhood’s
concerns about livability were paramount, the court did not analyze
179
RDNT’s attempts to improve livability. Unlike in C.R. Investments
Inc., where the court analyzed whether “turn-around areas in . . .
driveways” constituted a “reasonable condition” that would
eliminate a traffic hazard, the RDNT court did not consider
conditions that sought to improve the impact of traffic on the
180
surrounding neighborhood. For example, the court did not
evaluate the City’s consideration of conditions that sought to
improve parking, disperse traffic, slow traffic, and improve
181
driving. Furthermore, distinct from the TDMP, RDNT proposed a
“Good-Neighbor Policy” to address the impact of traffic on
182
surrounding streets. The policy involved “constructing speed
bumps at the facility entrances, encouraging and requiring all
employees to obey traffic laws, working with Google to achieve
more accurate and direct online directions, replacing vendors who
violate the TDMP policies, and retaining a traffic expert to monitor
183
the success of its policies.” However, there was no analysis
suggesting why these proposed conditions would be inadequate to
make the traffic less harmful. Thus, the court did not complete its
178. Id. at 74.
179. Id. at 77. However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did address the
“Good Neighbor Policy” in its opinion; it held that “RDNT already was required by
a pre-existing CUP to accommodate all vehicles at its facility ‘without on-street
parking,’ and the record indicates that the campus was unable to comply with this
condition.” RDNT II, No. A13-0310, 2014 WL 30382, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App.), aff’d,
861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015). The court of appeals appropriately considered the
“Good Neighbor Policy,” which moved beyond traffic volume and relates to the
impact of parking in the residential neighborhood. See id. It is unclear whether the
other asserted mitigating conditions were addressed by the court of appeals. See id.
180. Compare RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 78–79, with C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of
Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981).
181. To minimize traffic volume, RDNT offered to “expand the scope of its
[TDMP] to include, amongst other things, cash incentives for carpooling
employees, public-transit incentives for visitors, combined vendor deliveries, and
consolidated delivery times.” Brief & Addendum of Amicus Curiae Ebenezer
Society at 7, RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) (No. A13-0310), 2014 WL
8392645, at *7 [hereinafter Brief of Ebenezer Society].
182. Id.
183. Id.
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analysis to determine whether the City denied the permit
arbitrarily.
Because the court did not consider whether mitigating
conditions addressed the neighborhood traffic concerns, this case
184
is similar to Northpoint Plaza v. City of Rochester and Tri-City Paving.
In both of these cases, the courts held that the city’s CUP denial
was arbitrary when the city’s decision was based on neighborhood
opposition and not based on the consideration of new mitigating
185
conditions proposed by a developer to meet the city’s demands.
In Northpoint Plaza, the city denied a CUP based on neighborhood
opposition, even after the developer “altered its plans so as to
186
comply with all respondent’s requirements.” In a somewhat
different case, Tri-City Paving, the city imposed conditions on a
developer to “mitigate the negative effects of the noise, dust, and
trucks, included a 40 mile-per-hour speed limit, road management
187
for damage and dust, and operation within limited hours.” The
court held in Tri-City Paving that the city’s decision was arbitrary
when it denied the CUP despite the developer’s alteration of its
188
development plan to accommodate the imposed conditions.
In RDNT, although the City did not impose the mitigating
conditions at issue, RDNT took it upon itself to adapt its
189
development plan to address neighborhood traffic concerns.
Nonetheless, the neighborhood opposition in RDNT trumped
consideration of mitigating conditions, just as in the CUP decisions
184. See Tri-City Paving, Inc. v. Cass Cty. Planning Comm’n/Bd. of
Adjustment, No. A11-2054, 2012 WL 4475742 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012);
Northpointe Plaza v. City of Rochester, 457 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990),
aff’d, 465 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1991).
185. Tri-City Paving, 2012 WL 4475742, at *5; Northpointe Plaza, 457 N.W.2d at
404.
186. Northpointe, 457 N.W.2d at 401 (“The minutes of the common council
meeting for January 21, 1986, reflect that Superamerica had altered its plans so as
to comply with all respondent’s requirements, but that there was still considerable
opposition to the CUP.”).
187. Tri-City Paving, 2012 WL 4475742, at *4.
188. See id. (“Because the board’s first finding does not address how the
proposed CUP conditions would not satisfy the stated concerns in the finding and
because the finding is otherwise not supported by the record, we must deem the
finding arbitrary.”).
189. Brief of Ebenezer Society, supra note 181, at *7. To mitigate traffic
concerns, RDNT offered to decrease the total number of units in expansion,
reduce the building story levels, and increase the set-back, and provided photo
simulation to show sightlines would not be affected. Id.
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that brought about Tri-City Paving and Northpoint Plaza, where CUP
190
denials were found to be arbitrary. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme
Court failed to consider the proposed mitigating conditions as a
whole.
C.

Impact on Future Decisions and Care Services

RDNT’s proposed expansion served a quasi-public function by
providing services to a growing, vulnerable population, which
illuminates the importance of substantiating neighborhood
opposition testimony in CUP cases. For instance, RDNT is similar to
Hanson v. County of Carver Board of Commissioners where the court
held that a proposed expansion of a current use could exacerbate
existing traffic concerns resulting from increased volume of traffic,
191
which could suffice as a legitimate basis for denial. However,
equating RDNT to Hanson risks equating the nuisances of a mining
facility to the inconveniences of an elder care facility. While the
legal standard is the same for both cases, the context of a care
facility helps illuminate the consequences of an unfair process.
Assisted living facilities, such as Martin Luther Care Center,
provide essential care services to residents who can no longer live
independently—residents who can no longer be independent
192
homeowners. Broadening the reach of neighborhood opposition
193
caters to the “Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY) mindset and leaves
developers of care facilities vulnerable to unsubstantiated traffic

190. See RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 2015) (considering only the
proposed mitigating conditions that targeted the “minimization of the trip volume
by the proposed Traffic Demand Management Plan”).
191. See Hanson v. Cty. of Carver Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A05-2047, 2006 WL
2598283, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006). In Hanson, the CUP applicant
proposed to expand a mining operation, which would increase the number of
trucks where trucks were already causing considerable nuisance to the
surrounding neighborhood, namely from “[t]ruck noise and ‘jake braking’ . . .
dust and noise generated by current traffic . . . the lack of turn lanes and traffic
controls of nearby intersections have already caused delays . . . .” Id. at *3.
192. See RDNT III, 861 N.W.2d at 72–73.
193. See Michael Kling, Zoned Out: Assisted-Living Facilities and Zoning, 10 ELDER
L.J. 187, 196 (2002) (discussing the “NIMBY Phenomenon”); see also FISCHEL, supra
note 40, at 9–10 (“NIMBYism is weird only if you think solely about the rationally
expected outcome from development. NIMBYism makes perfectly good sense if
you think about the variance in expected outcomes, and the fact that there is no
way to insure against neighborhood or community-wide decline.”).
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194

impact allegations. The effects of RDNT have already been seen
in Minnesota.
LifeSpan of Minnesota, a Youth Transition Program that
provides day treatment services to school age children ranging
from five to eighteen years of age, applied for a CUP to build a
mental health facility for children, but the city denied the permit
195
due to neighborhood opposition. LifeSpan worries that the
process of building and expanding facilities for essential services
will “become political” if cities can “rely on anecdotal statements of
196
prospective neighbors.”
As demonstrated by LifeSpan’s
experience, RDNT has already impacted CUP permit decisions in
197
Minnesota.
The experiences of RDNT and LifeSpan represent an
emerging trend of CUP denials for care facilities. The RDNT
decision may make it more difficult for care services to meet the
198
needs of vulnerable Minnesotans. As the elderly population
199
increases and the market shifts, the need for assisted living
200
facilities will increase. The aging population is demanding the
194. See, e.g., HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON 5–9 (1998)
(discussing the NIMBY concept and how neighborhood opposition has prevented
the development of daycare facilities, AIDS treatment facilities, small group homes
for mentally ill patients, affordable housing, and homeless shelters).
195. Brief of Amicus Curiae Lifespan of Minnesota, Inc., RDNT III, 861
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) (No. A13-0310), 2014 WL 8392640, at *1–3.
196. Id. at *3.
197. See id. at *1.
198. Kling argues that an unfortunate “pattern” has formed because assistedliving facilities “tend to arouse much local opposition and typically end with a
permit denial by the local zoning board.” Kling, supra note 193, at 203. According
to Kling, this pattern has forced courts to “step in to counteract the local
government.” Id.
199. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Aging Services of Minnesota, RDNT III, 861
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 2015) (No. 0310), 2014 WL 8392644, at *10 [hereinafter Brief
of Aging Services] (“Minnesotans ‘are expecting and demanding more choice over
their long-term care. This trend is expected to accelerate as baby boomers, the
first real “consumer” generation, grow old and need care.’” (quoting MINN. DEPT.
OF HUMAN SERVS., STATUS OF LONG-TERM CARE IN MINNESOTA 2005: A REPORT TO
THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE 4 (June 2006), http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs
/2006/Mandated/060432.pdf)).
200. Brief of Aging Services, supra note 199, at *2–3. (“In 2011, the first wave
of baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) began to turn 65, and for
the next 30 years this cohort will profoundly affect the business of senior care.”);
see, e.g., Bayan Raji, Rise of Baby Boomers is Changing the Assisted Living Landscape,
HOUS. BUS. J. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/print-edition
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201

ability to “age in place,” and the court’s decision may impair the
ability of facilities to meet this demand.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of American zoning demonstrates how changing
American ideals have demanded protection of the single-family
home, greater flexibility in zoning, and limits to municipal
discretion through more express standards. Tools of flexibility
emerged to adapt to changing urban demands that were frustrated
by the rigidities of the original model of Euclidean zoning.
However, these devices, including CUPs, opened a debate about
the appropriate degree of municipal discretion.
Closer judicial analysis is due when weighing public concerns
202
in CUP denials. Rather than always deferring to local governing
bodies about decisions based on traffic and allegedly injurious uses,
courts have helped interpret (1) what constitutes traffic that is
“injurious” to the general welfare, (2) whether neighborhood
traffic concerns alone can be grounds for denial, and (3) whether
ignoring mitigating conditions to improve traffic impact constitutes
203
an arbitrary denial. These are all issues that restrict the discretion
of municipal decision makers and limit deference to legislature.
The RDNT decision increased the ability of local governing
bodies to (1) deny CUP applications on the basis of neighborhood
opposition alone and (2) disregard proposed mitigating conditions
204
that may improve traffic conditions in a neighborhood. While
neighborhood opposition testimony often seeks to protect the
important financial interest of the single-family homeowner,
allowing this testimony to go unsubstantiated risks restricting
otherwise permissible uses too broadly. Furthermore, enabling
municipalities to ignore proposed mitigating conditions that may
/2013/08/30/the-rise-of-baby-boomers-is-changing.html
(discussing
growing
demand to age in place).
201. “Aging in place” refers to a growing industry trend where “[m]any
seniors choose campuses where a full continuum of care is offered to individuals
to meet their variety of needs.” Brief of Aging Services, supra note 199, at *9; see
also Rebecca C. Morgan, What the Future of Aging Means to All of Us: An Era of
Possibilities, 48 IND. L. REV. 125, 131 (2014) (discussing the changing paradigms
and demands for elder housing and care).
202. See supra Part IV.
203. See supra Parts II.D, IV.
204. See supra Part IV.
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improve traffic livability and alleviate concerns undermines the
ability of developers to address concerns from neighbors in
development proposals.
The policy considerations regarding decreased access to elder
care are not the reason that the court should have held in RDNT’s
favor, but rather are an indicator of the importance of balancing
property interests. When essential residential and nursing care
services are at stake, it is more readily apparent that while
deference to legislature is important, so is a fair process.

